Judicial Arbitration in New York by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 36 
Number 1 Volume 36, December 1961, Number 
1 
Article 2 
May 2013 
Judicial Arbitration in New York 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1961) "Judicial Arbitration in New York," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 36 : No. 1 , 
Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/2 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK
Effective September 1, 1961, the New York Simplified Pro-
cedure for Court Determination of Disputes became available for
potential litigants. In order to implement the new legislation,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Civil Practice was rescinded, and Title
39, consisting of new Rules 304, 305 and 306, was adopted effective
October 16, 1961.1 The Judicial Conference of the State of
New York, in proposing the new procedure, indicated that it
wished to provide the commercial community with "a simplified
method of litigation, which combines the chief advantages of
arbitration-speed, ease, expertise and informality-with the chief
advantages of traditional common law trials-the adherence to
recognized principles of substantive law, the right to trial by
jury if desired, and the right to appeal .. ." 2 It is the purpose
of this note to attempt to ascertain the relative merits of the
Simplified Procedure as opposed to arbitration, and to determine
whether the new legislation will have any significant impact in
the drafting of contracts which provide for the disposal of future
disputes.
Section 218-a of the Civil Practice Act, enacted in 1956,
provided for the commencement of a civil action without the
service of a summons, or the continuation of an action after
service of summons, wfthout additional pleadings, by filing a
statement acknowledged by the parties, specifying the claims,
defenses and relief requested.3  The Judicial Conference, in its
Second Annual Report, stated that "this new procedure is designed
to provide the simple start and prompt hearing of cases which
the business community has found advantageous in arbitration." I
The trial of a case under this new procedure was to be con-
1 See Tripp, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Contract
Disputes: Judicial "Arbitration" in New York, 146 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1961, p. 4,
cols. 1-4.
2 1960 LEG. Doc. No. 98, N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT
AND STUDIES 96, 103 [hereinafter cited as 1960 LEa. Doc. No. 98].
s N.Y. CiV. PRAc. Acr § 218-a. See Hammerstein v. Woodlawn Cemetery.
21 Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
4 1957 LEG. Doc. No. 88, N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE SECOND ANNUAL RE-
PORT AND STUDIES 18.
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ducted in accordance with legal rules, before a jury or not, as
the parties might choose, and with the right of appellate review.5
It soon became apparent, however, that the streamlined procedure
made available by section 218-a was not being used by the parties
to commercial disputes, while the trend toward settlement of these
controversies before an arbitration tribunal continued unchecked. 6
A reason suggested for the indifference of the business com-
munity to section 218-a was that attorneys, in drafting contracts
for their clients, could provide that any future disputes arising
out of the agreement should be submitted to arbitration, while
section 218-a could be applied to existing disputes only.7  As
early as 1948, it had been reported that about three out of four
disputes before the American Arbitration Association were brought
pursuant to clauses in pre-existing contracts, the remainder being
submitted after the controversy had arisen.8 In order to remedy
its deficiency in this area, section 218-a has been amended,9 and
sections 218-b and 218-c have been enacted, the three sections
together to constitute the New York Simplified Procedure for
Court Settlement of Disputes.'
5 Ibid.
See 1960 LEG. Doc. No. 98, at 97.
7Id. at 97-98.
8 Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1022, 1023 n.ll (1948).
9The 1961 amendment added to section 218-a the following: "The
procedure in any action commenced under this section shall be as prescribed
by section two hundred eighteen-c of this article and rules adopted pursuant
thereto. Sections two hundred eighteen-a, two hundred eighteen-b and two-
hundred eighteen-c of this article shall together constitute 'the New York
Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes' and it shall be
sufficient so to identify the procedure in any contract or other document referring
to it. A submission of a controversy under this procedure shall constitute a
waiver by the parties of the right to trial by jury." N.Y. Civ. PcAC. AcT
§ 218-a.
20 N.Y. Civ. Pa.c. Acr § 218-b provides: "1. Any written contract,
otherwise valid under the substantive law, to submit any existing or future
controversy to the court pursuant to section two hundred eighteen-a of
this article is valid and enforceable and shall be construed as an implied
consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of this
state to enforce it pursuant to the procedures of section two hundred
eighteen-c of this article, and to enter judgment thereon, and shall con-
stitute a waiver by the parties of the right to trial by jury.
"2. If the parties to a dispute arising under a contract to submit
a controversy to the court under section two hundred eighteen-a of this
article are unable to agree on a statement of claims and defenses and
relief sought pursuant to that section, the court on motion shall settle
the terms of the statement. In deciding the motion the court shall consider
and determine any questions as to the existence of the contract or its
validity or the failure of any party to perform it. If a substantial issue
of fact be raised as to the making of the contract or submission or the
failure to comply therewith, the court or judge shall proceed to trial of
such issue without a jury, unless either party should demand a jury trial.
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The Judicial Conference, in proposing the Simplified Procedure,
made no attempt to conceal its distress regarding the "ever
increasing proportion of commercial disputes of the type once
settled pursuant to the principles of law as applied by our courts
[which] are now being s e t t I e d by extra-judicial arbitration
bodies." "1 Nor is the Judicial Conference alone in its anxiety.1
2
One of the more emotional critics of arbitration tribunals has
charged them with having "disregarded well-recognized principles
of law, scoffed surreptitiously at them . . . displayed the attitude
of judicial demigods who stood above the law of the community,
were not bound by it, and . . . could create and invoke their own
,, islaw....
There seems to be little doubt that many businessmen prefer
arbitration to litigation as a means of settling their controversies, 4
The procedure in any motion under this paragraph shall be as prescribed
by the rules of -civil practice."
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §218-c provides: "1. The procedure in any
action under the New York simplified procedure for court determination
of disputes authorized by sections two hundred eighteen-a and two hundred
eighteen-b of this article shall be as provided in this section and in the
rules of civil practice adopted to implement the provisions hereof. The
rules shall be designed to promote the speedy hearing of such actions
and to provide for such actions a procedure that is as simple and informal
as circumstances will permit. Rules adopted pursuant to this section
may provide among other things, for service of additional or amended
statements of fact, impartial expert testimony by witnesses appointed by
the court, and the pre-trial disposition of questions of law which might be
conclusive in the action and avoid a trial.
"2. The technical rules of evidence shall be dispensed with to the
extent specified in such rules of civil practice.
"3. The practice under this procedure relating to motions to stay
or to transfer pending actions, and relating to venue, assessment of costs,
entry of judgment, judgment by default, and the continuance of the
action in case of death or incompetency of parties shall be as prescribed
in the rules of civil practice adopted pursuant hereto.
"4. An appeal may be taken only from a judgment, or an order
determining the making of the contract or submission or the failure to
comply therewith. There shall be no oppeal [sic] from an intermediate
order of the court or of a judge in an action under the simplified pro-
cedure provisions, except with the permission of the trial or appellate
court, but such order or orders may be reviewed on the appeal from a
judgment entered under these provisions. A decision of the trial judge
on the facts shall be final if there is any substantial evidence to support
it."
111960 LE. Doc. No. 98, at 99.
12 Herzog, Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-A Present Need,
5 DE PAUL L. Rnv. 14, 25 (1955); Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration:
The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519, 556 (1960); Marks, Shaky
Foundation of Arbitration, 13 N.Y. CouNTY LAW. A.B. BuL. 206, 209
(1956).
13 Herzog, supra note 12, at 25.
14 See Rosenthal, A Businessman Looks at Arbitration, 2 Aan. J. (n.s.)
138, 139 (1947); Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies: The
[ VOL.. 36
and it has been reported that the number of commercial disputes
filed with the American Arbitration Association has reached an
average of 700 per year over the past five years.' The Judicial
Conference regards this trend from law to arbitration as un-
desirable since those who reject the courts for the arbitrator do
so, in their estimation, "for the sake of brevity and ease and
not for the sake of greater justice." 16 The Conference further
contends that the commercial community would look most favor-
ably upon a procedure for settling their disputes which would
combine the most desirable characteristics of traditional litigation
and arbitration; "7 hence the Simplified Procedure. On the other
hand, there is comment to the effect that the new legislation is
merely "another example of the attempt [by the courts] to woo
back business from the arbitrators .... [which] will have practically
no effect." 1s Which of these conflicting opinions is correct will
depend upon whether the new procedure can provide or improve
upon the advantages which commercial people seem to have found
in arbitration. Those advantages may be classified as (1) a
tailor-made decision "which comports with the subtle expectations
of the trade rather than with the necessarily grosser rules of
substantive law"; 19 (2) speed and informality; (3) expertise of
the decider; and (4) privacy and economy. Under the Sim-
plified Procedure, the court would adhere to the rules of sub-
stantive law and there would be a right of appeal from any
judgment entered under such procedure to an extent considerably
less broad than the appeal allowed in ordinary litigation.
2 0
Substantive Law v. Ad Hoc Justice
Proponents of the Simplified Procedure maintain that one of
the primary incentives for businessmen to use the new procedure
rather than arbitration is that "their problems will be solved in
accordance with the great principles of substantive law which have
Bisiness Man's Opinion: Trial at Law v. Nonjudicial Settlement, 83 U. PA.
L. REv. 147-48 (1934); Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1022 (1948).
'5Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 846, 858
n.25 (1961).
:L 1960 LzG. Doc. No. 98, at 100.
"7 Ibid.
Is Weinstein, Notes on Proposed Revision of the New York Arbitration
Law, 16 Aim. J. (n.s.) 61, 65 (1961).
29 Ibid.
20 See N.Y. Crv. Pac. Acr § 218-c(4). The scope of the appeal is
limited by the inability to appeal from intermediate orders, except where
permission is granted, and by the application of the "substantial evidence
rule" to decisions on the facts.
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been developed in the English-speaking world over a period of
many centuries." 21 In sharp contrast is the well-settled rule
that errors by an arbitrator in the determination of questions of
law or fact are not grounds for vacating an award nor are
they bases for review by the courts.2  The comment has been
made that "anything can happen" before an arbitrator,23 and
to a limited extent, such is the case. The use of precedent, so
familiar to the law court, has no place in commercial arbitration,
with the exception of the self-contained trade associations where
decisions rendered do have precedential value. 24  The casual
system of arbitration in use at the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation is designed to discourage the consideration of precedent,
and great pressure is put upon its arbitrators to refrain from
writing opinions, and merely to state their award in dollar amounts. 2
5
Of 180 arbitrators selected from the Association panel who were
questioned in regard to the manner in which they reached their
decisions, eighty per cent replied that they believed they should
reach their decisions within the context of the principles of
substantive law-but almpst ninety per cent stated that they
considered themselves free to ignore those rules when, in their
judgment, more just decisions would result from so doing. 28  For
instance, there is no hard or fast doctrine of damages observed
in arbitration, as- is illustrated by the awarding of loss of profit
to a buyer in one case,27 but only out-of-pocket losses in another.2
An arbitrator will not hesitate to order specific performance of
a contract of sale where the buyer has cancelled the order prior
to delivery in breach of his agreement. 29 Arbitrators have gone
21 1960 LEG. Doc. No. 98, at 100.
22Dembitzer v. Gutchen, 3 App. Div. 2d 211, 159 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st
Dep't), aff'd inem., 3 N.Y.2d 851, 144 N.E.2d 728, 166 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1957);
Pine St. Realty Co. v. Coutroulos, 233 App. Div. 404, 253 N.Y. Supp. 174
(1st Dep't 1931) ; A.D. Juilliard & Co. v. Baitch & Castaldi, Inc., 2 Misc. 2d
753, 152 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
23 Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1022, 1023 (1948).
24 Grossman, Arbitration and the Lawyer, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 511, 514 (1940);
Marks, Shaky Found(ttion of Arbitration, 13 N.Y. COUNTY LAW. A.B. BULL.
206, 208 (1956); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUm. L. Rv.
846, 857 (1961); Phillips, Rides of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial
Arbitration, 47 HARv. L. REv. 590, 606 (1934).
25 See Mentschikoff, supra note 24.2 d. at 861.
27See Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1022, 1026 n.32 (1948), which discusses
A.A.A. No. 4406 (July 16, 1947) (non-delivery of 1000 dozen nylon hose;
loss of $1,750 awarded).
28 d. at 1026 n.33, which discusses A.A.A. No. 4367 (June 4, 1947)
(buyer allowed only the $613 lost on resale of defective goods below
contract price where claim for profits was excessive).
29Id. at 1026 n.38, citing A.A.A. No. 4311 (April 3, 1947); A.A.A.
No. 4238 (Jan. 16, 1947).
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so far in their disregard for the rules of substantive law as to
order the specific performance of a contract for personal services,
a remedy not available in the courts.30 Arbitrators have been
castigated for practicing "some sort of folksy jurisprudence . . .
by making expediency the basic idea to be followed in the
determination of controversies." 31 It is alleged that compromise
has become the desired result, rather than a decision for one party
or the other, as justice may demand.3 2
Assuming it to be true that arbitrators have at times in-
tentionally disregarded the rules of substantive law, the question
remains whether use of this procedure does result in frequent
startling departures from those rules, and whether the alleged
"compromise approach" 33 is really present. There is a considerable
body of opinion to the effect that the answer is no. In practice,
it has been found that the awards of arbitrators demonstrate a
close adherence to the rules of substantive law insofar as it is
possible to isolate law from fact or procedure, and where the
ethical notions underlying the legal rules are pertinent in a particular
business context.34 The American Arbitration Association ex-
pressly encourages its arbitrators "to adopt a judicial attitude that
will lead to decisions on the merits rather than to a compromise
award." ' Should an arbitrator attempt to mediate or conciliate
between the parties, the hearing is immediately halted by the
tribunal clerk, who explains to the parties that the function of
the arbitrator is to come to a decision on the merits and not to
seek a settlement. 6 There is a growing fear among those who
are experienced in labor arbitration that the entire process is
growing too legalistic, and is surrendering by this legalism its
30 Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) (corporation ordered to retain in their employ officer
whom they considered disabled) ; see Note, 61 H~av. L. REV. 1022, 1028 & n.52
(1948), which discusses A.A.A. No. 4247 (March 3, 1947) (company ordered
to lay new carpeting in defendant's home in order to entitle itself to the
contract price). The Staklinski case has been discussed in 48 CALr. L. RBv.
140 (1960); 45 CoRNEL L.Q. 580 (1960); 73 HARV. L. REv. 776 (1960);
34 ST. JoHNx's L. REV. 293 (1960); 7 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 507 (1960).
31 Herzog, Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings -A Present Need,
5 DE PAUL L. REv. 14, 27 (1955).
32 Id. at 28.
a3 See Mitchell, Arbitration and Industrial Peace, 9 ARB. 3. (n.s.) 26, 30
(1954).
34 See Note, 61 HAlw. L. REv. 1022, 1024 (1948). This conclusion was
drawn by the author of the note cited from a study of approximately
300 cases arbitrated under American Arbitration Association rules from
October 1946 through December 1947.
3 Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUm. L. Rlv. 846, 860
(1961).
36Id. at 865.
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advantages over litigation.3 7  In short, it has been asserted that
arbitrators have been acting like judges, following the decisions
of the courts and citing cases as authority."' That decisions
on the merits are being rendered would seem to be clear from
the fact that a study of 396 cases conducted at the American
Arbitration Association disclosed that in fifty per cent of these
cases, one of the parties received the award in full,39 a result
apparently inconsistent with a widespread compromise approach.
In addition to the prospect of a decision in accord with rules
of substantive law, there is another incentive for attorneys to
employ the Simplified Procedure rather than a general arbitration
clause in attempting to provide a means of settling commercial
disputes which may arise from the contract. That incentive is
the ability to predict the outcome of disputes, since they would
be settled in conformity with the rules of substantive law. Where
there is an existing conflict and the client's case is clearly in
his favor under the rules of substantive law, the attorney has
good reason to avoid an arbitration which might determine that
the equities require a result other than that which the legal
precedents would demand.40 Where a future dispute is involved,
however, it would appear that an element of uncertainty renders
both procedures unpredictable. Since the arbitrator is not bound
by the rules of substantive law, what his decision might be in
any future dispute is relatively unascertainable. Since the attorney,
at the time of drafting the contract, cannot foresee the legal nature
of the dispute which may arise in the future, he cannot know
whether the rules of substantive law which would be applicable
to this potential controversy would be favorable to his client's cause
or not. But the Simplified Procedure presents a desirable feature,
in that the knowledge that rules of substantive law will be
applied can serve as a valuable guide to conduct where alternative
courses of action present themselves, and issue, though not yet
joined, can be perceived.
On the whole it is questionable whether the Simplified Pro-
cedure, with its promise of decisions based on substantive law,
is any real innovation, since "in all states, if the parties provide
in the arbitration agreement that the arbitrator must decide ac-
cording to law, courts will hold the arbitrator to that agree-
7 Editorial, Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration, 13 Aam J. (n.s.)
129 (1958); Warns, Arbitration and the Law, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 386, 390
(1959).
38 Ibid.
39 Mentschikoff, supra note 35, at 861; Smith, Commercial Arbitration at
the American Arbitration Association, 11 ARB. J. (n.s.) 3, 13 (1956).
49 See Grossman, Arbitration and the Lawyer, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 511, 515
(1940). See also MAmas, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTEm 555 n.12 (1955).
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ment and will review the law on appeal." 4" The powers of an
arbitrator are only those which the parties have chosen to confer
upon him, and their desire to have rules of substantive law applied
to a dispute is binding upon him, so long as it is clearly ex-
pressed in the agreement.4 2 Since the opportunity to have con-
troversies settled according to law has been possible without the
new legislation, it would appear that this characteristic of the
Simplified Procedure, considered alone, will not prove to be a
great attraction to those drafting contracts and including a pro-
vision for the settlement of future disputes.
Speed and Informality
The speed and informal atmosphere of the arbitration hearing
have always been advanced as among its most attractive features.43
It has been reported that in over half of the cases arbitrated
under American Arbitration Association Rules during a forty
month period from July 1947 through October 1950, the total
elapsed time from initiation to award was under ninety days."
In the usual case, the hearing takes but a few hours.45  This
speed of settlement is highly important from -the businessman's
point of view because a lengthy proceeding can be ruinous where
a substantial amount of working capital is tied up by the dispute.
48
In addition, arbitration awards are rarely challenged in the courts,
and if challenged, are almost always upheld,' since the statutory
grounds available in New York for vacating the award are ex-
tremely narrow."
The informality of the hearing seems to have a salutary
effect not only upon the parties, but also upon witnesses, by
making them feel at ease and enabling them to relate a clearer
story than in the courtroom, where they often become nervous
41Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration,
47 Hanv. L. R.-v. 590, 603 (1934); cf. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 299, 169 N.E. 386, 390 (1929) (dictum by Cardozo, J.).
42 Phillips, supra note 41, at 603-04.
43 See Grossman, supra note 40, at 512; Rosenthal, A Businessman Looks
at Arbitration, 2 ARm. J. (n.s.) 138, 140 (1947); Smith, supra note 39, at
17; Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies: The Businessman's
Opinion: Trial at Law v. Nonjudicial Settlement, 83 U. Pa. L. REv. 147,
150 (1934); Weinstein, Notes on Proposed Revision of the New York
Arbitration Law, 16 Am. J. (n.s.) 61, 65 (1961).
14 Smith, supra note 39, at 3, 17.
45Note, 61 HA~v. L. Rav. 1022 n.1 (1948).
4" See Rosenthal, supra note 43, at 139.47 Note, 63 HAmv. L. REv. 681, 682 (1950). But see Phillips, Rules of
Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HAi v. L. REv. 590,
609 (1934).
4See N.Y. Crv. P Ac. Acr § 1462.
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and confused.4 ' Some observers have expressed the belief that
at these informal hearings, where the rules of evidence are not
applied, hearsay evidence is given too much credence, that irrelevant
testimony obscures the issues in contention, and that failure to
control the witnesses encourages perjury.50 Defenders of arbitra-
tion reply, however, that the technical rules of evidence are in-
voked for the benefit of the lay jury to prevent them from
being misled, rather than for the guidance of the experienced
judge."x They further contend that it is far more in the interests
of justice to allow a witness to express himself fully in order
to assure him that he has been granted a complete hearing.52
Attorneys report that in complicated cases, such as those involving
mechanics' liens, they have been able to accomplish in a few
hours what would have taken a few weeks of trial in a court
action.53 It is interesting to note the effect which the presence
of attorneys has apparently had on the speed with which an
arbitration proceeding is finally settled. In almost all self-contained
trade associations and exchanges, participation by attorneys in
the arbitration proceedings is either expressly forbidden or strongly
discouraged. 54 The reasons given for this attitude are: "(1) lawyers
did not understand the business usages and practices that were
typically involved in adjudicating the dispute and were there-
fore not helpful; and (2) lawyers made the proceedings unduly
technical and tended to create unnecessary delays."5 5  Statistics
gathered from the records of the American Arbitration Association
would seem to uphold the second assertion. It was found that
when both parties to the hearing were represented by attorneys,
only 43 per cent of the cases were decided in less than ninety
days, and only 21 per cent in less than sixty days.' 6  On the
49 Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1022 n.3 (1948).
50 Id. at 1023 n.15.
51 Warns, Arbitration and the Law, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 386, 396 (1958). See
generally Phillips, A Practical Method for the Determination of Business
Fact, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 230 (1934).
52 Warns, supra note 51, at 396.
53 Arbuse, The General Case for Arbitration, 31 FLA. B.J. 129, 130
(1957). But see Phillips, mipra note 51, at 242, commenting upon the
arbitration case which consumed nine days because the arbitrators, all out-
standing building experts, were forced to listen to testimony of other building
men regarding their opinions on the construction of a building which the
arbitrators had previously examined. The arbitrators felt it necessary to
hear such testimony in order to protect themselves from the charge of
having excluded competent evidence. Had the arbitrators been able to
exclude such testimony, the hearing would have taken but a few hours.
54 Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 846, 859
(1961).
55 Ibid.
56 Smith, Cominercial Arbitration at the American Arbitration Association,
11 ARB. J. (n.s.) 3, 18 (1956); Mentschikoff, supra note 54, at 859.
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other hand, where neither party to the hearing was represented
by an attorney, 78 per cent of the cases were settled in less
than ninety days and 49 per cent in less than sixty days.5 7
Under the Simplified Procedure, every effort has been made
to equal or better the speed and informality of the arbitration
tribunal. Rule 306(1) of the Rules of Civil Practice provides
that "the rules as to the admissibility of evidence, except as
provided by statutes relating to privileged communications, and
as to procedure shall be dispensed with unless the court shall
otherwise direct, and shall not apply to or exclude, limit, or
restrict the taking of any testimony and the adducing of any
proof." 5 Rule 306(5) (d) provides that the court may limit or
restrict the number of experts to be heard as witnesses, while
subdivision (g) provides for the granting of summary judgment
in favor of any party. 9 It is difficult at this time to attempt
to predict in any concrete manner the length of time which an
average action might take. Obviously, much will depend upon
the eagerness or lack of it with which the business community
embraces the new procedure as a means of settling their con-
flicts. The Judicial Conference, in its study of the new legislation,
indicated that at present, there is no calendar congestion in com-
mercial and other contract cases,60 and it is anticipated that
cases submitted under the Simplified Procedure will meet with
no delay.
From the point of view of speed of settlement, the Simplified
Procedure profits greatly from the fact that the parties have a
right of appeal considerably less broad than is available from an
ordinary action.61  This is a major factor to be considered, since
the inability to appeal from intermediate orders, and the ap-
plication of the "substantial evidence rule" 62 to decisions on the
5 Ibid.
5sN.Y.R. CIV. PRAC. 306(1).
59N.Y.R. Civ. P~c. 306(5).
60 See 1960 LEG. Doc. No. 98, at 104. But see Weinstein, Notes on the
Proposed Revision of the New York Arbitration Law, 16 Am. J. (n.s.)
61, 64-65 (1961), alleging that this lack of congestion results from (1)
preferring commercial cases over negligence cases, (2) the failure to apply
calendar classification rules to commercial cases, so that a case which could
be tried in a lower court is allowed to remain in the Supreme Court, and
(3) the pre-trial of negligence cases only.6 N.Y. Crv. P Ac. AcT §218-c(4) provides that "there shall be no
oppeal [sic] from an intermediate order of the court or of a judge in an
action under the simplified procedure provisions, except with the permission
of the trial or appellate court . . . . [and] a decision of the trial judge on
the facts shall be final if there is any substantial evidence to supportit."
62Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. . . . [I]t must
be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a
1961 ]
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facts, will undoubtedly keep the number of appeals at a minimum.
These deviations from the usual right of appeal indicate the im-
portance with which the Legislature regards the need for a speedy
and final settlement. A possibility of delay results from Rule
305(3) of the Rules of Civil Practice which provides that "if the
court shall find that a substantial issue of fact has been raised
as to the making of the contract or submission, or the failure to
comply therewith . . . the court shall proceed expeditiously with
the trial thereof without a jury, unless either party . . . shall
have demanded in writing a trial by jury. . .. ,, 18 In short, if
the validity of the contract or submission is challenged, and
a substantial question of fact arises, the anticipated streamlined
proceeding can become the usual type of litigation, complete with
jury, if one of the parties so demands .4  However, the same
thing may happen in arbitration if a party makes timely objection
under Section 1450 of the Civil Practice Act.
5
On balance, it would seem that the Simplified Procedure, once
in motion, should be as speedy as arbitration, if not more so.
Under certain circumstances, however, a jury trial as provided
in section 218b(2) .6 will result in an unanticipated delay-
but this may also occur in arbitration. The possibility of an
appeal leading to delay would seem to be equal for both procedures.
However, statistics regarding the effect which the presence of
attorneys has apparently had on the speed of the arbitration
proceeding would lead one to wonder whether they might not
have the same effect on the streamlined Simplified Procedure.
6 7
Expertise of the Decider
It has been said that "even if we had private, speedy, cheap
jury trials, there would still be a great number who would turn
to arbitration because they can obtain thereby an expert business
verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact
for the jury." NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292, 300 (1939). See generally DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §29.02
(1959).
63 N.Y.R. CIrv. PRAC. 305(3).64 Ibid. Rule 305(3) implements N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act §218-b(2).
65 N.Y. Civ. PmAc. Act § 1450. But see Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta,
9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961), holding that, where the
contract provided for arbitration of any dispute, whether a contract of
employment lacked mutuality was a question for the arbitrators regardless
of whether it involved a question of fact or mixed question of fact and
law.
66N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §218-b(2).
67 See text accompanying notes 56 and 57 supra.
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judgment of the facts involved. ' ' 8 The American Arbitration
Association maintains a panel of over 9000 businessmen, bankers
and lawyers from which arbitrators can be chosen who are expert
in their particular field.69  The time and expense involved in
securing the testimony of expert witnesses is often eliminated
because the arbitrators, or one of them, are expert themselves.
7
0
This is not to say that in every case which comes before an
arbitration tribunal there is an expert on the panel who is
familiar with the custom and usages of the trade. Whether one
can expect to have an expert on the panel often depends on
the nature of the contract from which the dispute arose.71  For
instance, a study of 649 cases which involved all types of
contracts indicated that in cases involving contracts of sale where
the quality of the goods was at issue, an expert was on the
panel in 73 per cent of such cases, while in disputes involving
employment contracts, an expert in the area was present in only
25 per cent of the cases.7 2
Under the Simplified Procedure, Rule 306(2) of the Rules
of Civil Practice provides that if "the court shall be of the
opinion that evidence by an impartial expert would be of material
aid to the just determination of the action, it may direct that
such evidence be obtained." 73 Section 218-c states that the rules
may provide for "impartial expert testimony by witnesses ap-
pointed by the court . . ." It is not quite clear whether the
rules require that the court appoint the impartial expert, but that
would seem to be the only way to obtain impartial testimony,
since experts selected by the parties would probably be chosen
on less than an objective basis. Nor is it clear whom the court
may direct to obtain such evidence. In addition, there may
arise the problem of whether the impartial expert witness ap-
pointed by the court is acceptable to each of the parties. It
would seem clear that either party should have a right to challenge
such a witness for possible hostility about which the court could
68 Phillips, A Practical Method for the Determination of Business Fact,
82 U. PA. L. REv. 230, 234 (1934).
,9 Smith, Commercial Arbitration at the American Arbitration Association,
11 Apa. J. (n.s.) 3, 10 (1956); see Rosenthal, A Buwinessan Looks at
Arbitration, 2 APB. J. (n.s.) 139, 140 (1947).
70 Grossman, Arbitration and the Lawyer, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 511, 512
(1940).
71See Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 846,
860 (1961); Smith, supra note 69, at 10-11. But see Braden, Sound Rules
and Administration in Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. Rav. 189, 196 (1934),
proposing that the parties, more interested in securing advocate§ than experts,
will rarely select the arbitrators on the basis of their technical knowledge.
72See Mentschikoff, supra note 71; Smith, supra note 69.
73N.Y.1. Cirv. PRAc. 306(2).
74N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 218-c(l).
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have no knowledge; or because there had been business dealings
between the witness and one of the parties which might suffer
because of certain testimony, or for a number of other reasons.
It is difficult to deny that many businessmen have left the
courtroom with bitterness, convinced that their defeat was the
direct result of the court's failure to understand the intricacies of
the issue.75  The frequency with which the court has to be
painstakingly informed regarding matters which, to the litigants,
appear elementary does little to deter such ill feeling.76 It seems
likely that the Simplified Procedure will not be able to improve
upon the usual litigation in this area of expertise. Expert wit-
nesses have always been available. The court's education in
the complex business practices of the litigants is as necessary
as it ever was, and unlike arbitration, it is the court and not
the expert who decides the result. That judges endowed with
extensive knowledge of general commercial practices are available
is undoubtedly true, and should the new procedure receive the atten-
tion of the business community to the extent anticipated by its pro-
ponents, it seems likely that the courts will become ever more
adept in handling the subtle facets of commercial dealings,
77
especially in the delicate area of contract construction where an
intimate knowledge of trade customs and usages is almost essential.
For the present, however, it would appear that commercial arbitra-
tion has the clear advantage.
Privacy and Economy
The privacy which the parties enjoy in arbitration has always
been considered one of its more attractive features.78 The public
airing of private matters, trade secrets, confidential operating costs
and the attendant loss of prestige and good will which often result
from the publicity of a court trial are several of the reasons why
the commercial community has been abandoning litigation for
7 See Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies: The Business
Man's Opinion: Trial at Law v. No-nudicial Settlement, 83 U. PA. L.
REv. 147, 150 (1934).
76 Ibid.
77 See Callahan, New Simplified Procedure Act, 146 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24,
1961, p. 4, cols. 2-3, indicating that justices of the Appellate Division in
the First and Second Departments "have considered favorably the setting
up of a special part or parts to hear cases arising under the new law
to which will be assigned justices experienced in the disposition of
commercial litigation."
78See Braden, supra note 71, at 195; Grossman, supra note 70, at 514;
Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47
HARV. L. REv. 590, 606 (1934); Rosenthal, supra note 69, at 140.
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arbitration.75  Awards in arbitration are generally private, and
arbitrators are encouraged not to give reasons for their decisions
in the award. 0 In addition to this desirable element of privacy,
arbitration is usually more economical than the ordinary form of
litigation.81 There is generally no record before a court re-
viewing an arbitration award, unless the parties have chosen to
go to that expense.8 2  The American Arbitration Association
provides hearing rooms and clerical help, takes care of all notices,
and only a nominal fee is charged for each hearing. 3  Ar-
bitrators are not usually paid, either by the Association or the
contending parties.8 4
The Judicial Conference proposed, in regard to the rules which
could be adopted to implement the Simplified Procedure, that
there might be "informal hearings in chambers in appropriate
cases. .. ." 85 The rules adopted are silent upon this matter,
but section 218-c would seem to imply the power of the court
to do so by enabling it "to provide for such actions a procedure
that is as simple and informal as circumstances will permit."
As regards economy, use of the Simplified Procedure will probably
result in comparable costs, unless a lengthy appeal is taken from
the trial court's decision. The informal atmosphere of litigation
under the new procedure should have the same salutary effect
upon the future relations of the parties as has the informality of
arbitration.
The Right of Appeal
The Simplified Procedure provides that "an appeal may be
taken only from a judgment, or an order determining the making
of the contract or submission or the failure to comply there-
with. . . . A decision of the trial judge on the facts shall be
final if there is any substantial evidence to support it." 87 It
should be noted that appellate review of findings of fact is limited
"to the same extent that judicial review of such findings by
administrative bodies is circumscribed . . . [, that is,] the weight
of the evidence is not subject to judicial review . . . [and] the
79 See Braden, mtpra note 71, at 195.80 See Phillips, supra note 78, at 606.
s1 See Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitdue, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 519, 522 (1960).82 Ibid.
83 See Arbuse, The General Case for Arbitration, 31 FLA. B.J. 129, 130
(1957).
84 Ibid.
85 1960 LEG. Doc. No. 98, at 97.
S6N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §218-c(I).87 N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. ACr § 218-c(4).
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judicial function is exhausted as to the facts when there is found
to be a rational basis for the findings of the [lower court] ..... ,8
This application of the "substantial evidence rule" 9 will un-
doubtedly reduce the number of appeals taken from decisions
of the trial court on the facts, and will serve to lessen the pos-
sibility of the litigants' becoming involved in an extended ap-
pellate review.
An arbitration award, on the other band, may be challenge'd
in one of two ways: (1) by opposing a motion to confirm, 0 or
(2) by making a motion to vacate the award.9 ' In either case,
the following are the grounds for setting aside the award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means.[92]
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators
or either of them.[93]
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party were prejudiced.[94]
(4) Where the arbitrators or other persons making the award exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.[95]
(5) If there was no valid submission or contract, and the objection has
been raised under the conditions set forth in section fourteen hundred fifty-
eight. [906] 97
The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, however, is
broader than the statute would appear to allow.98  The New York
courts have vacated and set aside arbitration awards which con-
88 Tripp, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Contract
Disputes: Judicial "Arbitration!" in New York, 146 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25,
1961, p. 4, col. 4.89 See generally DAVIS, ADmIniSTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.02 (1959).9 0 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1461.
91 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 1462.
92 See Livingston v. Banff, Ltd., 13 Misc. 2d 766, 178 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
113See Shirley Silk Co. v. American Silk Mills, Inc., 260 App. Div. 572,
23 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1st Dep't 1940).
94See Simons v. New Syndicate, Inc., 152 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
95See Kyne v. Molfetas, 3 App. Div. 2d 384, 160 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1st
Dep't 1957) (per curiam).
96 See Behrens v. Feurring, 182 Misc. 979, 49 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct.
1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 930, 58 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1945),
aff'd, 296 N.Y. 172, 71 N.E.2d 454 (1947).9 7 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1462.98 See Gold, Considerations of Equity in Vacatur of Arbitral Awards,
15 APB. J. (n.s.) 70 (1960); Herzog, Judicial Review of Arbitration Pro-
ceedings-A Present Need, 5 DE PAUL L. Rav. 14 (1955); Jalet, Judicial
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travened or violated a particular statute,99 which have given cus-
tody or visitation rights in pursuance of a separation agreement,100
where an error of law appears on the face of the award,' 10 where
the award was found excessive or permitted punitive damages, 02
and where the court determined that there was nothing for the
arbitrator to decide.' 0 3  In recent years, however, there seems
to have been a relaxation of the courts' attempt to limit the power
of the arbitrator. It has been indicated that it is the public policy
of New York to encourage arbitration, which may account for the
present highly liberal attitude of the Court of Appeals in reviewing
awards. 0 -
The right of appeal provided for under the new legislation
is clearly a desirable element, since it ensures the opportunity of
having errors of law and decisions on the facts which are arbitrary
and have little or no support in the record, corrected on review.
Although the power of the courts to review arbitration awards is
considerably more broad than the statutory grounds would ap-
parently allow, the scope of that power is not equal to the review
afforded by the new legislation. For those primarily interested
in a speedy determination and who possess "that spirit of con-
ciliation which so often conduces to . . . finality in arbitration
proceedings,"' 0 5 the right of appeal offered by the Simplified
Procedure may not offer any great inducement. For many, how-
ever, such right will be a primary motivation'for using a "Simplified
Procedure clause" to provide a means of settling their future
disputes, rather than a general arbitration clause.
Conclusion
The New York Simplified Procedure for Court Determination
of Disputes would seem to be a step in the right direction. It
indicates a recognition by the Legislature of the needs of com-
mercial litigants-needs which normal court procedure seems un-
Review of Arbitration: Tire Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNEmL L.Q. 519 (1960);
Mayer, "Judicial Bulls" in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration,
2 LAB. LJ. 502 (1951); Note, 63 HARV. L. REv. 681 (1950); Note, 21 U.
CmI. L. REv. 148 (1953).
99 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299
N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949).
100 See Hill v. Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
01 See Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (1875).
102 See Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper Union, 280 App. Div. 500, 114
N.Y.S2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952).
'03 See Alpert v. Admiration Knitwear Co., 304 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E2d 561
(1952).
104 See Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d
133, 137, 168 N.E.2d 377, 378-79, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306-07 (1960).
10o MAYERs, THE AmEiCuA La-aAL SYsTEm 555 (1955).
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able to satisfy. The new procedure appears to be ideal for the
settlement of existing disputes which the parties desire to be settled
according to the rules of substantive law and with the right of
appeal. Whether it will be incorporated in contracts as a means
for the settlement of future disputes is questionable. 06  The ob-
stacle of overcoming human inertia and resistance to change imposes
an immediate burden upon the Simplified Procedure. Much re-
mains to be seen. If the procedure receives sufficient publicity
and trial by the business community, it may be a reform of great
significance. Its success or failure will, in large measure, depend
upon the cooperation of judges and attorneys in accomplishing its
announced aim, that is, "a simplified method of litigation which
combines the chief advantages of arbitration . . . with the chief
advantages of traditional common law trials-the adherence to
recognized principles of substantive law, the right to trial by jury
if desired, and the right to appeal. ,107
)X
THE EFFECT OF ESTOPPEL ON THE RECOGNITION OF
SISTER STATE DIVORCE DECREES IN NEW YORK
In general, estoppel may be defined as a prohibition against
the knowledgeable assumption of an obviously inconsistent position
in relation to previous acts.' Within the context of a marital con-
troversy, its immediate effect is to prohibit a party from asserting
the invalidity of a decree of divorce.2  This note will discuss the
circumstances under which, and the parties against whom, the
estoppel may be generally applied.
In order to properly appraise the law of estoppel in cases where
a decree of divorce is attacked on jurisdictional grounds, it is first
106 See Weinstein, Notes on Proposed Revision of the New York Arbitra-
tion Law, 16 ARB. J. (n.s.) 61, 65 (1961).
107 1960 LEG. Doc. No. 98, at 103.
1 See McCLINTOCK, EQUrTY 79 (2d ed. 1948). For a treatment of the
origin of estoppel see 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 802 (5th ed.
1941).
2 In Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940), this judicial
impediment was treated as a quasi-estoppel because the court said it was not
a true estoppel although its effect was the same. See Borenstein v. Borenstein,
151 Misc. 160, 270 N.Y. Supp. 688 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 761,
274 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 407, 3 N.E.2d 844 (1936),
wherein the court stated that this was not an estoppel and that no one has
defined what it is. For convenience it shall be hereinafter referred to as
"estoppel"
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